Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law
Volume 9 | Issue 1

Article 8

2003

The Role of Expert Witnesses in German and U.S.
Civil Litigation
Sven Timmerbeil

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Timmerbeil, Sven (2003) "The Role of Expert Witnesses in German and U.S. Civil Litigation," Annual Survey of International &
Comparative Law: Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol9/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact jfischer@ggu.edu.

Timmerbeil: Expert Witnesses in Germany and the U.S.

THE ROLE OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN
GERMAN AND U.S. CIVIL LITIGATION

SVEN TIMMERBEIL·

I.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. and German civil trial systems differ not only in many details
but also regarding their fundamentals. The U.S. civil trial system seems
to be basically a battle of the parties in which the lawyers are
protagonists and warlords. I The judge has most often only a passive role.
In contrast, in German civil litigation, the judge generally has a very
active role. The judge controls the proceedings, examines the witnesses
and is always the decision maker. 2 Other differences include the lack of
pre-trial discovery in Germany and the important role of court experts in
German civil litigation. Due to the active role of German judges,
American lawyers partly describe the German civil procedure system as
inquisitorial.3
This article focuses on the difference between the role of experts in
German and U.S. civil litigation. In theory, expert witnesses seem to be
only a small detail in the whole system. However, considering their

* Sven Timmerbeil holds a J.D. (equivalent) from the University of Freiburg, Germany and a
LL.M. degree from Georgetown University Law Center. He is a teaching assistant and a Ph.D.
candidate at the University of Freiburg, Germany. He is a member of the New York bar.
I. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823,
823 (l985)("lawyer-dominated system") [hereafter cited as Langbein, German Advantage].
2.
Id. at 828 (,The [German] judge serves as the examiner-in-chief').
3.
See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 49 (1984) ('Judge-centered
inquisitorial process").
163
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importance in German and U.S. civil trial practice,4 the role of expert
witnesses in both systems is worth analyzing. What is the role of an
expert witness in German and U.S. civil litigation? On the one hand, the
expert could serve to support the interests .of the party employing her
expertise. Although this does not necessarily preclude the expert from
also supporting the truth-finding process, any conflict between
supporting one party and supporting the truth-finding process may result
in manipulated or false testimony.s On the other hand, the expert could
(only) support the decision-maker in finding the truth, and, in this sense,
could be considered an extension of the decision-maker. These are the
possible roles or functions of expert witnesses. However, to make the
issues discussed in this analysis easier to conceptualise, consider the
following hypothetical case, which will be referred to throughout the
paper:
Paul goes to a hospital for an appendectomy. Except for his appendix,
Paul is healthy. After the surgery, Paul feels worse. He experiences pain
in his legs and arms and gets strong headaches when he is awake for
more than three hours; neither conditions are common after an
appendectomy. As a result of the pain and headaches, Paul has another
surgery which is successful and costs $20,000. Paul hires a lawyer, and
files a lawsuit against the hospital. Discovery is conducted; settlement
negotiations fail; trial preparation begins. The only issue at trial is
causation, i.e., whether the first surgery (the appendectomy) caused the
pain and the headaches. If the first surgery caused this pain, and
consequently also the second surgery, Paul will win the case.
Paul and his lawyer come to the conclusion that an expert witness is
needed to help them prove causation. Further assume two different
scientific methods can be used to prove causation in this case. The use of
Method 1 results in the conclusion that there is causation; the use of
Method 2 results in the conclusion that there is no causation. Method 1 is
the majority opinion of medical experts. However, some doctors and
experts support Method 2.
The situation presented in the above hypothetical is common in Germany
and probably also in the U.S. 6 In order to identify, compare and evaluate
4.
See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 58 (5 th ed. 1999)("In the past two decades, the use of
expert witnesses has skyrocketed").
5. "Manipulated" means in this context that the expert does not testify in the way she would if
she is not hired by the party. This can begin with the choice of words and with the clearness of the
testimony and can end with incomplete or even false testimony.
6. Another common example for different expert opinions besides causation issues is the
valuation of companies and real estate.
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the differences in German and U.S. civil litigation regarding expert
witnesses, this article will describe how the hypothetical case would be
tried in both jurisdictions. The analysis will first focus on expert
testimony in U.S. civil litigation (part II), and then it will tum to the
German law regarding expert witnesses in civil litigation (part III). The
article will then compare the role of experts in both systems (part IV),
and finally, a conclusion will be presented (part V).

II.

EXPERT WITNESSES IN U.S. CIVIL LITIGATION

At least in theory, there are two ways of choosing expert witnesses in
U.S. civil litigation: the expert is either hired by a party or appointed by
the court.
1.

EXPERTS HIRED BY THE PARTIES

a.

The Selection of the Expert

In U.S. civil litigation a party may hire its own expert witness. The party
has the choice which expert it hires. This so-called "expert shopping"7
gives the party the opportunity to hire an expert who best supports the
party's view. 8 The parties are not interested "in finding the best scientist,
but the best witness".9 Although the expert is hired by the party, he or she
should be objective and neutral. lO The party's lawyer will prepare the
expert for testifying at trial. II

b.

The Hypothetical Case

In the hypothetical case, Paul's (plaintiff) lawyer will hire an expert who
adheres to Method I, i.e., will likely conclude that the first surgery
caused the pain which necessitated the second surgery. 12 The expert will
7.
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTE on FRE 706.
8.
Compare T. Dunkelberger & S. Curren, Debating Court-Appointed Experts, N.Y.LJ., Feb.
13, 2001 at S8, ("it is natural that the plaintiff will choose an expert from one polar end of the
spectrum of scientific opinions, and the defense will choose an expert from the other"). See also
William T. Pizzi, Expert testimony in the US, 145 NEW L. J. 82, 83 (1995).
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, at 80; John B. Molinari, The role of the expert
9.
witness, 9 Forum 789, 791 (1973/1974).
10.
Mortimer Nickerson, The Expert Technical Witness on Trial, 50 ABA J. 731, 732 (l964).
II.
Compare Pizzi, supra note 8, at 83 ("trial lawyers have become more sophisticated at
controlling experts and at preparing them for trial so that their testimony is shaded to achieve the
maximum effect on the jury").
12. Of course there are also other important criterias which should be taken into account when
hiring an expert such as personality, experience, expert qualifications, fees, credibility and

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

3

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 9 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 8

166

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 9:1

examine Paul and present her results to him and his lawyer. Paul's
lawyer will then prepare the expert for testifying in court. She will advise
the expert regarding the presentation of testimony and prepare her for
cross-examination by the defendant's lawyer. Cross-examination is a
critical point in the trial because Paul's expert must survive the crossexaminer's questions, which will attempt to discredit the expert's
testimony and cast doubt upon her scientific conclusions. However, this
is not the end. It is likely that the defendant will also hire an expert. 13 Of
course, the defendant will select an expert who supports the defendant's
view. Again, witness preparation, direct examination and crossexamination are conducted. Finally, the fact finder decides which expert
is more convincing and, therefore, right; ergo, who wins the case. 14
c.

Assisting the Trier of Fact

Under the Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702, the expert should assist
the fact finder. Yet do the experts in the hypothetical case really help?
Both experts offer plausible "stories;" each supports the story of one
party with scientific knowledge. Therefore, although experts primarily
support the parties who hire them, the scientific knowledge they present
may also assist the fact finder in determining the truth. Since both sides
to a dispute often rely on expert witness testimony, the fact finder is
presented with two (or more) possible scientific explanations. In the end,
the fact finder has to decide which "story," or testimony, is more
plausible. Thus, the expert witness has two basic functions: (1)
supporting a party's story 15 and (2) providing a possible scientific
explanation for the issue. 16

persuasive effect. See also ROBERT ARON & JONATHAN
FOR TRIAL § 15.05 (2nd Ed. 1998).

L.

ROSNER, How TO PREPARE WITNESSES

13.
A survey of 529 civil trials in California in 1985 and 1986 revealed that in 86% of these
cases experts testified. The average of experts per trial was 3.3. See Samuel R. Gross, Expen
Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1118-1120.
14.
For the influence of expert testimony on the trier of fact see R. L. Tanton, Jury
Preconceptions and their Effect on Expen Scientific Testimony, 24 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
681, 689-690 (1979).
15.
This does not necessarily mean that the expert is not objective.
16.
But see Molinari, supra note 9, at 791 ("the function of the expert witness is to teU the jury
the truth"). But compare J. H. Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Couns, 54 HARV. L. REV. I lOS,
1106 (1940/41) ("[the expert witness] frequently operates to confuse the judge or jury rather than to
inform").
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COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS

According to FRE 706, the court may also appoint its own expert
witness. I? Courts use this power when a factual issue arises that would be
better solved with the support of scientific knowledge and the partisan
experts are not helpful due to their relationship to the parties.

a.

The Selection of the Expert and Further Proceedings

The parties have no influence on the selection of a court-appointed
expert. 18 However, even if the court appoints an expert, the parties may
still hire their own expert witnesses. 19 The court has discretion over
whether to disclose to the jury that the expert witness has been appointed
by the court. 20 The court-appointed expert shall be available for pre-trial
deposition,21 but no rule governs whether the court expert should testify
before or after the party-selected experts. Usually a judge would prefer
to call the court expert after the testimony of partisan experts as this
would allow the judge to question the court expert about discrepancies
and weaknesses in the other experts' testimony. Even if not specifically
informed, a jury will notice the different procedure used by the judge
when examining the court expert, and as a result, the jury will be aware
of the unique role of the court expert. This can result in a "special aura
respectability"22 for the court expert. Because this aura can influence the
jury, judges apply FRE 706 far less frequently in jury trials than in nonjury trialS. 23 After the examination by the judge, the parties have the
opportunity to cross-examine the court expert under FRE 706 (a),24 and
according to FRE 706 (b), compensation for the court expert can be
assessed by the court as it deems appropriate.

17.
Such an appointment is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. See Students of Calif. Sch.
for the Blind v. Honig, 736 F.2d 538, 549 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 148,
105 S. Ct. 1820,85 L.Ed. ed 114 (1985).
18.
Compare Gross, supra 13, at 1190.
19.
The court-appointed expert should not replace the experts which are hired by the parties
but should complement them. [d. at 1190. See also FRE 706 (d).
20.
See FRE 706 (c).
21.
Gross, supra 13, at 1190.
22.
Compare CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES 719 (4th ed. 2000).
23.
Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts: Defining The Role Of
Experts Appointed Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 706 48 (Federal Judicial Center 1992)(only
20% of trials in which court-appointed experts testify are jury trials).
24.
Compare also Robert F. Taylor, A Comparative Study of Expert Testimony in France and
the United States: Philosophical Underspinnings, History, Practice, and Procedure, 31 TEx. INT'L
L.1. 182, 212 (1996) and Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A
Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 480, 494
(1988).
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The Hypothetical Case

In the hypothetical case mentioned above, the court could appoint its
own expert witness at the pre-trial stage. 25 In addition, the hospital and
Paul can also hire their own expert witnesses. The expert witnesses
would testify in favor of the party that hired them followed by the court
expert. Suppose that the court-expert applies Method 1. It is up to the
fact finder to determine which "story" is more plausible. In this scenario,
it is likely that the fact finder will decide in favor of the plaintiff, finding
that causation exists for two reasons. First, two experts testified in favor
of the plaintiff, while only one testified in favor of the defendant.
Second, the court-appointed expert, who is presumably neutral and
independent, testified in favor of the plaintiff. Consequently, the factfinder is more likely to believe that a verdict for the plaintiff is the
correct decision. In practice, the trier of fact most often follows the view
of the court expert. 26

c.

The Use of Court Experts in Practice

Court-appointed experts are rarely used in U.S. civil litigation. 27 A
survey of federal judges28 revealed that 81 % had never appointed an
expert under FRE 706, and only 8% had appointed a court expert more
than one time. 29 The court does not often appoint its own expert because
of the adversarial tradition and the problem of compensation, despite
FRE 706 (b).30 Moreover, many judges and lawyers may be unaware of
the possibility to appoint a court expert. 3)

3.

CRITICISM

Europeans32 look skeptically at the way expert witnesses are used in U.S.
civil litigation. In almost all cases the experts are partisans,33 simply
repeating their party's story and supporting it with scientific knowledge.
25.
GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 706.2 (3d ed. 1999).
26.
The Federal Judicial Center found out that in 56 of 58 cases the jury followed the view of
the court expert. See Cecil et aI., supra note 23, at 52.
27.
See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 720. ("Rule 706 is one of the least-used provisions
in the Federal Rules"). See also Pizzi, supra note 8, at 82.
28.
The judges were mainly involved in large civil cases where court experts could be useful.
29.
See Pizzi, supra note 8, at 83.
30.
See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 719-720.
31.
Compare John Jerry Wiley, The Doctor in Coun: lmpanial Medical Testimony, 40 S. CAL.
L. REV. 728, 734-735 (1967); Gross, supra note 13, at 1197.
32.
Excluding Great Britain and Ireland which, like the U.S., are common law countries.
33.
See also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
86 (1973) ("the partisan nature of trials tends to make partisans of the witnesses").
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The fact finder hears only opinions favorable to the respective party.
Although the experts should be independent and objective, it is not easy
for a European lawyer to believe that they really are. The experts, at least
financially, depend on the parties, and this may influence their
objectivity. As a result, a European lawyer would doubt whether experts
can really support the court in seeking the truth. 34
However, the Europeans are not the only critics regarding this use of
expert witnesses. Some authors in the U.S. demand that court experts be
used more frequently. They complain that partisan experts are only the
"saxophones"35 of the parties. "The ready availability of a large stable of
experts who, in return for a nice fee, seem eager to testify on one side or
the other of a lawsuit is hardly a recent development."36 There is a big
concern about the objectivity of experts. 37 "Nobody likes to disappoint a
patron; and beyond this psychological pressure is the financial
inducement. "38
In addition, it can be very difficult for a jury to determine which expert
opinion is correct because the jurors lack the scientific knowledge
needed to evaluate the experts' testimony. 39 Bazelon, a former chief
judge said that even most judges are illiterate regarding technical issues. 40
In the end, "success may depend on the plausibility or self-confidence of
the expert, rather than his professional competence."41
Even courts42 and legislators43 have doubts that partisan experts are
independent and objective. The Advisory Committee proposed, and
34.
Compare also John H. Langbein, Legal Institutions: Trashing the German Advantage, 82
Nw. U. L. REV. 763, 766 (1988) (''Testimony that is rehearsed and molded by adversaries is
materially less trustworthy than testimony that is free of such influences").
35.
Langbein, German Advantage, supra note I, at 835.
36.
Pizzi, supra note 8, at 82; Compare also John M. Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal
Judge to Call his own Expert Witness, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 29, 30 (1955/1956) ("hired courtroom
lying").
37.
Langbein, supra note 34, at 764 ("litigation-biased expert witnesses that American lawyers
recruit and pay to bolster preordained results").
38.
Langbein, German. Advantage, supra note I, at 835.
39.
Dunkelberger et aI., supra note 8, at S8.
40.
David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 817, 817 (1976/1977).
41. John Basten, The Court Expert in Civil Trials - A Comparative Appraisal, 40 MODERN L.
REV. 174, 174 (1977).
42.
Compare Keegan v. Minneapolis and St LRR 76 Minn 90, 95 (1899) ("Experts are
nowadays often the mere paid advocates or partisans of those who employ them, as much so as the
attorneys who conduct the suit").
43.
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTE on FRE 706 ("The practice of shopping for experts,
the venality of some experts, and the reluctance of many reputable experts to involve themselves in
litigation, have been matters of deep concern."). Compare also Langbein, supra note 34, at 775 ("An
expert hired to buttress a preordained position is engaged more in advocacy than in truth-seeking").

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

7

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 9 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 8

170

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 9:1

Congress enacted, FRE 706 in the hope that the common law rule44
regarding court-appointed experts would be applied more frequently if
written down in a statute. Under FRE 706, court experts should not
replace party-experts, but only complement them. Additionally, by
enacting FRE 706 the parties should be deterred from presenting their
own expert who is capable of being discredited by a court expert.45
On rare occasions, even the courts believe that party-experts are not
useful and therefore appoint their own expert. In particular, in sensitive
areas like child custody cases, courts often prefer to appoint their own
expert due to concerns about the child's welfare and because it would be
difficult for a partisan expert to examine the opponent party.46 Due to the
sensitive issues involved, the opponent party is likely to be offended is
examined by the other party's expert, and therefore, will not cooperate
with a partisan expert.
4.

PAST PRoPOSALS ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS ABOUT THE
OBSTRUCTION OF THE TRUTH SEEKING-PROCESS BY PARTYEXPERTS

There have been several proposals to solve the concerns about the
obstruction of the truth seeking process by partisan experts. One
proposal was to establish a science court consisting of experts,47 which
would evaluate the different scientific arguments of the parties and their
experts. 48 In contrast to an ordinary U.S. court, the science court would
have a more active role. However, the establishment of such a court
would increase the cost of the proceedings enormously because qualified
experts from many different scientific fields would need to be hired
permanently, which requires competitive salaries being offered. In
addition, these experts would need a basic legal education. Therefore,
this proposal could only be realized for big cases.49 Even though most
44.
Case law already gave the trial judge the power to appoint a court expert before the Federal
Rules of Evidence were codified in 1975. See Scott v. Spanjer Bros. Inc., 298 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir.
1962).
45.
See ADVISORY COMMnTEE'S NOTE on FRE 706; see also Eastern Air Lines Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957,1000 (5 1b Cir. 1976) ("a great tranquilizing effect").
46.
See for example Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d 153, 157 (D.c. Cir. 1945); an experienced New
York litigator, Robert A. Burstein, confirmed this also for nowadays. Compare also Scott v. Spanjer
Bros. Inc., 298 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1962).
47.
For the various approaches see James A. Martin, The Proposed "Science Coun", 75 MICH.
L. REv. 1058, 1064-1069 (1977).
48.
Arthur Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment: Criticism and Responses, 33 THE
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 44 (1977) ("the Science Court is intended to deal only with
scientific questions of fact").
49.
See id. at 43-50 for some problems which could arise.
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civil cases in federal courts involve disputes totally more than $75,000,
the cost of the proceedings would still be disproportional. Thus, for
"everyday cases," it seems that a more extensive use of court-appointed
experts (FRE 706) would be the easiest and cheapest solution.
Another approach, suggested by Judge Learned Hand,50 was to establish
special juries of experts. These juries would recommend decisions on
scientific issues. Despite concerns regarding the constitutionality of such
special juries,51 this approach also seems to be very expensive because
the "expert jury" would exist in addition to the judge and the jury.
Basten mentions the possibility of establishing "expert judges."52 This
could be realized either by hiring experts as judges for certain scientific
fields or by giving the current judges the opportunity to obtain scientific
knowledge in specific areas. Again, this approach would be very
expensive, and the problem would not be completely solved due to the
existence of numerous scientific areas, making it impossible to have an
expert for each scientific issue that arises in trial.
In a recent case regarding silicone breast implants, the judge established
a scientific panel to improve the truth-seeking process - after billions of
dollars in damages were paid as a result of adversarial litigation. 53 The
panel found no evidence that breast implants cause systematic diseases.54
In this case, the adversarial approach failed because of the weaknesses of
partisan expert testimony. The plaintiffs' expert claimed that he
examined more than 4,700 women, which greatly increased the salary of
the expert. Not surprisingly, the expert testified in favor of the plaintiffs.
However, a medical student later testified that she received $50 per hour
from the expert for examining 3 to 4 women per hour. Thus, the expert
did not examine the women on his own even though he testified that he
did. 55
Finally, an approach has been suggested by the American Academy for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) which proposes a new system
called the Court Appointed Scientific Experts (CASE). In this system, a
committee would be established to help judges search for neutral experts
50.
Learned Hand, Historical And Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REV. 40, 56 (1901).
51.
Compare Basten, supra note 41, at 188.
52.
[d. at 190.
53.
Compare Dunkelberger et a!., supra note 8, at S8.
54.
For details of the case see George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale - The Law and Ethics of
Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1,2-3 (2000).
55.
For more details see id. at 2-3.
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on a case-by-case basis. This project is currently being evaluated by the
Federal Judicial Center.56 CASE could make it easier for the court to
find an expert, thus solving one of the problems in applying PRE 706,
i.e., finding an expert. However, the court would still need to decide
whether or not to appoint its own expert, which appears to be a greater
obstacle to overcome.
All past proposals to provide non-partisan experts have failed. Yet they
are not even necessary for a court to obtain neutral expert testimony
because legislation already provides the necessary medium with FRE
706. Consequently, the issue is not how the courts can obtain neutral
expert testimony, but rather, why they do not appoint neutral experts
under PRE 706.

5.

DEFENSE OF PARTISAN EXPERTS

Although there is much criticism of the current situation, there is also a
lot of concern that the establishment of non-partisan experts will
undermine the U.S. adversarial system. The concerns are that a court .
expert compromises the impartiality of the judge, limits party control and
destroys the parties' right to a jury decision. 57 It has been suggested that
court experts would have too much power and become de facto fact
finders - especially when more than one opinion exists on a scientific
issue. 58 Deason argues that an expert is probably never completely
neutral,59 and even if Deason is incorrect, "[ ... J intelligent, objective
scientists will still have disagreements over basic scientific issues."60 If
the strong influence of court experts on the outcome of a trial is believed,
it would be dangerous to appoint a court expert because then the outcome
of the case would only depend on which scientific opinion the specific
court expert endorses. 61 Therefore, Dunkelberger & Curren suggest that
"[ ... J the role of the court-appointed expert might be to act as an

56.

[d. at S8.
57.
See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial
Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1,74-80 (1978). Compare also Gross, supra note 13, at 1193.
58.
Compare Gross, supra note 13, at 1193-1194.
59.
Ellen E. Deason, Coun-appointed expen witnesses: Scientific positivism meets bias and
deference,77 OR. L. REV. 59,99-121 (1998).
60.
Dunkelberger et aI., supra note 8, at S 13.
61.
But see MUELLER ET AL, supra note 22, at 719 ('The fear that a court-appointed expert will
be viewed as the responsibility of one party or another is answered in part by language allowing any
party actually to call the expert and entitling all to cross-examine").
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'interpreter' for the jury, explaining the science involved in terms that the
jury will understand while not advocating either ~ide of the issue."62
The lack of non-partisan experts in U.S. civil litigation involves
fundamental characteristics of U.S. civil litigation. In an adversarial
system, where parties are the protagonists who investigate the facts, the
court plays only a passive role. Although the function of the judge has
changed over the last several years from that of a passive supervisor of
the proceedings to a case manager,63 courts still do not see factinvestigation as their proper role, and therefore, they do not apply FRE
706.

III.

EXPERT WITNESSES IN GERMAN CIVIL LITIGATION

In contrast to U.S. civil litigation, expert witnesses in Germany are
usually court experts, although the parties can also hire their own
experts.

1.

COURT EXPERTS IN GERMAN CIVIL LmGATION

a.

Experts versus Witnesses

The German Civil Procedure Code (ZPO) distinguishes between (lay)
witnesses and court-experts. In German civil litigation, an expert is not a
witness, but instead provides a separate form of evidence.64 The German
Code of Civil Procedure provides separate rules for court experts. 65
However, as far as the rules pertaining to court experts do not provide
specific regulations, the rules about (lay) witnesses are partly applicable
(ZPO § 402).

The Selection of the Expert

b.

Under ZPO § 404, the court selects the expert. 66 Usually, the judge has
prepared a list of experts from which one expert is chosen.67 However,
Dunkelberger et aI., supra note 8, at S 13.
See Langbein, German Advantage, supra note I, at 858.
64.
ZOELLER, ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG § 402/1 (23nd ed. 2002); see also STEIN/JONASLEIPOLD, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG vor § 402/4 (21st ed. 1999); LEO ROSENBERG & KARL HEINZ
SCHWAB & PETER GOTTWALD, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 717-718 (15th ed. 1993); Langbein, German
Advantage, supra note I, at 835.
65.
See ZPO §§ 402-414.
66.
See ZOELLER, supra note 64, § 404/1. STEIN/JONAS-LEIPOLD, supra note 64, vor § 402/1.
KLAUS MUELLER, DER SACHVERSTANDIGE 1M GERICHTLICHEN VERFAHREN 83 (2nd ed. 1978).
62.

63.
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the court's discretion is limited by ZPO § 404 (2) which gives priority to
those experts who are officially designated for a specific field of
expertise.68 The court can also ask the parties to suggest an expert.69 If
the parties agree to the appointment of an expert, the court is bound and
has to appoint that expert under ZPO § 404 (4). However, there is no
possibility to review the court's appointment of an expert without
appealing the final judgement, i.e. that entire case. 70
If the court appoints an expert without the parties' consent, each party
may seek to recuse the expert, but only for certain narrow reasons. 71
Regarding the reasons which justify recusing the court-appointed expert,
ZPO § 406 (1) refers to ZPO §§ 42-45 which deal with the reasons for
recusing a judge. Therefore, the standard for recusing an expert and
recusing a judge is the same. A judge may be recused only when it
appears that she is not neutral,72 e.g. when the judge offends a party or is
a friend or relative of one of the parties. 73 Similarly, a party can reject
the appointment of a court expert for the same reasons she can reject a
judge. If one party seeks to recuse the expert, the court decides whether
to grant the party's request. If the court denies the request, the party can
appeal under ZPO § 406 (5).
c.

Further Proceedings

After appointing the expert, the court instructs the expert under ZPO §
404a, deciding which issues should be examined by the expert and
regulating the extent to which the expert is allowed to contact the parties.
In any case, the court expert has to be neutral and independenf4 - at least
in regard to the parties. The court must disclose to the parties every
order it gives to the expert.

67.
Compare KURT JESSNITZER & GONTER FRIELING, DER GERICHTLICHE SACHVERSTANDIGE
80 (10th ed. 1992). See also R. SCHLESINGER, H. BAADE, P. HERZOG, E. WISE, COMPARATIVE LAW
467 (6th ed. 1998).
68.
For details see STEIN/JONAS-LEIPOLD, supra note 64, at § 404/15-16. See also Langbein,
German Advantage, supra note I, at 837-838.
69.
See ZPO § 404 (3).
70.
A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH, J. ALBERS, P. HARTMANN, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, §
404n (61 th ed. 2003).
7J. See ZPO § 406 (I).
72.
STEIN/JONAS-LEIPOLD, supra note 64, at § 406/1.
73.
Compare the list at BAUMBACH ET AL., supra note 70, at § 42114-17.
74.
JESSNITZER ET AL., supra note 67, at 109. Compare Langbein, supra note 34, at 775
("neutral expertise is central to Gennan civil procedure").
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The general rule is that court-appointed experts testify orally in court;75 in
practice, many court experts submit a written opinion,76 which is allowed
if ordered by the court under ZPO § 411 (1). However, even if the court
expert submits a written opinion pursuant to a court order, the court may
still order the expert to appear at trial to explain her opinion. 77 At trial,
the judge examines the expert. If the court is not convinced of the
expert's view, it could appoint a new expert under ZPO § 412 (1).
Afterwards, the lawyers of the parties have the opportunity to examine
all experts who were also examined by the judge. Usually, only a few
questions are asked, and in German civil litigation, the questioning of an
expert by the lawyers can be described as a polite questioning in a nonconfrontational atmosphere. Since leading questions are not allowed in
German civil litigation, this examination is not comparable with the
cross-examination in U.S. civil trials. 78 Another reason why the parties
and their lawyers question the expert in such a deferential manner is
obvious: the court appointed the expert and gave her orders during the
proceedings. Attacking the expert would be equivalent to criticizing the
judge's authority to select and question the expert - and in German civil
courts, the judge is always the decision-maker. Therefore, also strategic
reasons create the non-confrontational atmosphere between the parties
and the court-expert.
d.

Evaluation of the Expert Testimony by the Judge

Under ZPO § 286, the court has discretion as to whether or not it follows
the view of the court-appointed expert. 79 In either case, the court has to
explain why, in its opinion, the expert has the necessary scientific
knowledge and why it follows her opinion or not. so The court cannot
adhere to the expert's opinion if the opinion is not based on the particular
facts of the current case at bar as well as the supporting scientific
reasoning used. 81 However, the expert is not required to mention other
scientific methods which lead to different results. As stated, the judge is
the decision-maker, and under no circumstances should the judge transfer
this decision-making power to the court-expert. 82 In practice, courts

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See BAUMBACH ET AL., supra note 70, at § 41111.
Compare ZoELLER, supra note 64, at § 41111.
See ZPO § 411 (3).
See R. SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 67, at 457; ZoELLER, supra note 64, at § 397n.
ZPO § 286; see also ZoELLER, supra note 64, at § 402na.
BAUMBACH ET AL., supra note 70, at § 286/50-53.
[d. at § 286/58.
ZoELLER, supra note 64, at § 404a11.
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usually83 follow an expert's opinion because it is often not possible for
the court to understand and control the reasoning of the expert due to the
court's lack of scientific knowledge.84
e.

The Hypothetical Case

In the hypothetical case, if Paul and the hospital are not able to settle, the
court will appoint an expert based on ZPO § 144. The judge will likely

choose the expert from a list which she prepared. This list includes the
name of Emma who is a famous expert in the field of medical causation.
Emma is famous because of her support of Method 2, about which she
has published many articles. The fact that Emma supports Method 2
gives the plaintiff no reason to seek to recuse her, and the parties have no
other reason to justify Emma's recusal as a court expert. The judge
instructs Emma that she should examine Paul and determine if the first
surgery caused the need for the second surgery. The judge discloses
these orders to the parties, and except for Paul's examination, neither
party has contact with the expert. After the examination, Emma writes
her opinion, which applies Method 2. Emma writes her opinion
thoroughly because she wants the judge to be satisfied with her work;
otherwise the judge would remove Emma's name from the list and not
appoint her in the future. 85 Because she applied Method 2, Emma
concludes that the first surgery did not cause the second surgery. She
considers also mentioning Method 1 in her written opinion; however, she
decides not to do so because it is not necessary to justify her results. In
addition, mentioning Method 1 could confuse the judge who would then
have to decide which method should be applied. Emma thinks that she is
expected to make this decision for the judge.
Emma submits her written opinion to the court. The court asks her to
explain it orally at trial, which she does. The judge is not independently
knowledgeable about causation in medical cases, and because of her
heavy caseload, she has no time to study books about this issue.
Therefore, the judge is very happy that Emma explains her expert
opinion in a clear and understandable way. What Emma says makes
sense to the judge, and the judge has no reason to ask Emma for other
applicable methods. Just to make sure of the completeness of Emma's
testimony she asks Emma if Method 2 is supported by other experts.
83.
See Horst Sendler, Richter und Sachverstiindige, NJW 1986,2907,2909 (empirical studies
showed that the court follows the opinion of the court expert in 95% of the cases).
84.
Compare BAUMBACH ET AL., supra note 70, at vor § 40212.
85.
See also Langbein, German Advantage, supra note I, at 838 ("the most important factor
predisposing ajudge to select an expert is favourable experience with that expert in an earlier case").
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Emma answers that several experts and doctors support this method. The
judge is satisfied and therefore stops questioning Emma. Paul's lawyer
politely asks Emma about Method 1. Emma answers that Method 1 is
supported by many experts, but Method 2 is the upcoming, modern
method and cannot be called a minority opinion anymore. Paul's lawyer
knows that it makes no sense to attack Emma because the judge
appointed her. At the end of the trial the court decides in favor of the
defendant based on Emma's testimony. Paul has to pay for Emma's
expenses. 86
Paul is very disappointed. Method 1 is a well-recognized method which
is probably supported by the majority of experts. It was just bad luck for
him that the judge appointed Emma and not someone else as the court
expert in his case. Furthermore, he even has to pay for Emma's services
even though she testified against him. Paul asks his lawyer what he can
do. The lawyer answers that Paul can appeal de novo87 the decision of
the court. It would then be within the discretion of the Court of Appeal
whether to follow the lower court's opinion, appoint a new court expert
or examine Emma again.88 However, Paul's lawyer also points out that
this will result in additional costs, and if Paul loses the case on appeal, he
will have to pay the court and hospital's reasonable legal expenses for
both instances. Due to this risk Paul decides not to appeal the trial
court's decision.
This result is probably not acceptable from an American lawyer's
perspective. The outcome of the case only depends on which expert is
appointed by the judge. The expert seems to decide the case for the
judge, and the influence of the parties is limited.
2.

EXPERTS HIRED BY THE PARTIES IN GERMAN CIVIL LITIGATION

a.

Party-Selected Experts - Not Evidence

In German civil litigation the parties can also hire their own experts. 89
However, there are no rules in the German Civil Procedure Code dealing
with these party-selected experts. The German courts have held that an
86.

There is no contractual relationship between the parties and the court expert. See
note 64, at vor § 402/41. But under ZPO § 91 the losing party has to
pay the reasonable expenses of the winning party and also of the court, including the expenses for a
court expert.
ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 64, at 840-842.
87.
88.
Compare STEIN/JONAS-LEIPOLD, supra note 64, at vor § 402127 and also at § 404/6.
89.
Id. at vor § 402/56.
STEIN/JONAS-LEIPOLD, supra

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

15

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 9 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 8

178

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 9:-1

opinion of such an expert does not have the same value as the opinion of
a court expert.90 Courts usually doubt the reliability of partisan experts
who are hired by the parties and have discussed the case with counsel.91
Therefore, the opinion of a partisan expert is considered only as an
assertion of a party92 and is not evidence. 93 The party submits the
expert's report to the court, but the party-expert is not examined at trial.
Parties V. Witnesses

b.

In German civil litigation, parties may only testify at trial in certain
narrow situations which are described in ZPO §§ 445-447. A party is not
a witness. 94 Usually the plaintiff alleges facts in her pleadings. If the

defendant denies these facts, the plaintiff has to offer testimony to prove
these facts. There are five types of evidence in German civil litigation:
witnesses, documents, court experts, the parties (in certain narrow
situations), and judging by appearances. Except in rare cases where the
party is allowed to testify, the party with the burden of proof must offer
one of the other four types of evidence. This is a fundamental difference
with U.S. civil litigation where the party can testify if she desires.
As previously mentioned, the German courts held that opinions of partyexperts are not considered as evidence, but only as a party assertions.
However, a partisan expert can discredit the court expert's opinion, and
in such situations, the court can - although not required to and in
practice, rarely does - appoint another court expert. 95 However, the court
cannot base its final decision solely on the party-expert's opinion. 96 If
the party-experts have differing opinions, the court is required to appoint
its own expert.97

90.
Id. at vor § 402156. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 64, at 718. See also MOLLER, supra
note 66, at 40-41.
91.
Compare Koetz, Civil Litigation and the Public Interest, I eIV. JuST. Q. 237, 241 (1982);
Langbein, German Advantage, supra note I, at 834; Langbein, supra note 34, at 767.
92.
93.

BGH NJW 1993,2382,2383.
But see also BGHZ 98, 32, 40 (holding that partisan expert opinion can be introduced into

evidence if both parties agree).
94.
See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 64, at 705. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note I,
at 834.
95.
STEIN/JONAS-LEIPOLD, supra note 64, at vcr 402157.
BGH VersR 1981,575,576.
96.
STEIN/JONAS-LEIPOLD, supra note 64, at vor 402157; see also BGH NJW 1998,2735.
97.
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The Hypothetical Case

What does this mean for the hypothetical case? Even if Paul and the
hospital each hired an expert, the outcome would most likely be the same
as before. The judge appoints its own expert, and bases the decision on
the court expert's opinion.
d.

The Significance of Party-Selected Experts

Although experts who are hired by the parties are not as commonplace as
court experts in German civil litigation, party-experts are still used,
particularly in cases involving the evaluation of damages or fault. 98 In
recent years, the German Supreme Court (BGH) has raised the
significance of partisan experts in trial by requiring the losing party to
pay the reasonable expenses of the winning party's expert under ZPO §
91,99 and by requiring the court to deal with the partisan expert's
opinion. loo The court cannot simply disregard the partisan expert's view
anymore. It has to take a look at the partisan expert's opinion and has to
explain in its reasoning why it does not follow the partisan expert's view.
3.

CRITICISM

The German Civil Procedure Code distinguishes between court experts
and witnesses. Party-selected experts cannot testify at all. This formal
difference between court experts and witnesses on the one hand and the
fact that the party can seek to recuse the court-appointed expert for the
same reasons as judges shows the very specific and different role of court
experts in German civil litigation. There is a close relationship between
the court and the court expert. 101
a.

The Court Expert as de facto Decision Maker

In theory, the German system regarding experts seems to support the
truth-seeking process more effectively. The court expert is independent
from the parties and also objective. The German Civil Procedure Code
tries to safeguard the parties' interests by giving them the right to seek to
recuse the court expert. Additionally, the parties can ask follow-up
98.
Compare JESSNITZER ET AL., supra note 67, at IS.
99.
[d. at 172. As already mentioned in note 85 under ZPO § 91 the loosing party has to pay
the reasonable expenses of the court and of the winning party.
100. BGH NJW 1996, 1597, 1598; NJW 1998,2735; NJW-RR 1994,219,220-221.
101.
Compare STEIN/JONAS-LEIPOW, supra note 64, at § 406/1.
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questions after the judge examines the expert. Finally, the parties can
also hire their own experts, although these party-selected experts can not
testify.
However, in practice the German way is not always perfect, as illustrated
by the hypothetical case. Even if you consider the hypothetical an
extreme case it shows that German court experts can cause problems in
the truth-finding process. Too much depends on the court expert, and in
many cases, it is not the judge but the court expert who decides the case.
Although the court expert in Germany is not the judge,102 she is at least
an arm's-length adviser of the judge lO3 who supports the court in finding
the facts. 104 To some extent, the judge is no longer independent; because
of her lack of scientific knowledge, the judge must trust the court
expert. lOS Therefore, several German authors have criticized that the court
expert is often the de facto decision-maker. 106

b.

The Problem of Multiple Scientific Opinions

Another problem arises in German civil litigation when different
scientific opinions exist. Of course, a good court expert will mention all
of them in her opinion. However, if the expert supports one opinion, it is
obvious that she will not be neutral anymore with respect to the other
existing opinions. Furthermore, the opportunities of the parties to
"correct" this deficit are few due to the lack of an effective crossexamination. Even if a party hires her own expert who explains the other
existing opinions, it is not certain that the judge will abandon her trust in
the court expert she personally appointed. Usually, the judge will be
convinced by an expert she has selected. I07 Even if the hypothetical case
is an extreme case regarding the behaviour of Emma who only focused
on Method 2 without mentioning Method 1 in detail, it is a possibility
that poses a danger to the truth-seeking process. "Disagreements
between opposing experts can be constructive in that they demonstrate
the extremes of opinions within the scientific community, but are
102.
JESSNITZER ET AL., supra note 67, at 6.
103.
BGH NJW 1998, 3355, 3356; see also STEIN/JONAS-LEIPOLD, supra note 64, at vor §
40213; ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 64, at 716; WILHELM KLOCKE, DER SACHVERSTANDIGE UND
SEIN AUFTRAGGEBER 32 ( 2nd ed. 1987); see also Langbein, German Advantage, supra note I, at
835 ("judges' aides").
104.
STEIN/JONAS-LEIPOLD, supra note 64, at vor § 40217 (neutral adviser of the judge).
105.
See Dirk Dlzen, Das Verhaeltnis von Richtem und Sachverstaendigen im Zivilprozess
unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung des Grundsatzes der freien Beweiswuerdigung, 93 ZZP 66, 7273 (1980).
106.
STElNlIoNAS-LEIPOLD, supra note 64, at vor § 40212 (in practice the court expert is the
real judge which cannot be prevented but which is also very problematic).
107.
Sendler, supra note 83, at 2909.
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perplexing to the finders of fact."los On the other hand, in German civil
litigation there are usually no disagreements between experts because
most often there is only one.
IV. COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF BOTH SYSTEMS
REGARDING EXPERTS
As seen before, the role of expert witnesses in both trial systems is very
different.
1.

Ev ALUATION OF THE USE OF EXPERTS IN THE U.S.

In the U.S., experts are usually partisans of the parties who support the
parties' claim with scientific knowledge. Because there is usually more
than one expert, there is also more than one scientific opinion which is
presented to the fact finder. Since the expert has a closer connection to
the party who hired her than to the court, there is the danger that her
objectivity will be compromised. The U.S. civil trial system seeks,
among other purposes,l09 the truth.IIO The danger that experts are
influenced can manipulate the truth-seeking process. However, the
system provides safeguards such as cross-examination, III impeachment
and the opportunity for the opponent to call her own expert witness. The
basic idea of the U.S. civil trial system is that after all the information by
the experts is provided, the fact finder will be able to determine the truth.
Furthermore, in the U.S. civil trial system, the fact finder is also the
decision-maker - even if the fact finder is not able to follow and
understand the expert's opinion. I 12

2.

Ev ALUATION OF THE USE OF EXPERTS IN GERMANY

In contrast, in the German civil trial system, most often only one expert
testifies at trial, and she is usually appointed by the court. Like in the
U.S., the expert provides her scientific opinion to the fact finder, but
because of the lack of a real cross-examination and the weak influence of
\08.
Dunkelberger et aI., supra note 8, at S8.
109.
E.g. dispute resolution.
110.
See FRANK, supra note 33, at 80-102.
III.
But see Pizzi, supra note 8, at 83 (1995) ("these protections have never seemed to work
very well when it comes to experts [ ... J because the expert is much more at home in the area of his
expertise than the lawyer"). See also Sink, supra note 36, at 196 ("Cross examination will not make
him more objective").
112.
Compare Beuscher, supra note 16.
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party-selected experts, there are no effective opportunities to control and
evaluate the expert's opinion. Of course, the court can appoint a second
expert, but it will only do this when it doubts the first expert's opinion.
This will usually not happen for two reasons. First, the judge does not
have the scientific knowledge necessary to validate the expert's
testimony. Second, the judge may be influenced by the fact that she has
selected the expert and possibly even worked with the expert in prior
cases. Consequently, the German court expert does not only provide
information to the judge but also decides de facto, the factual issue.
3.

COMPARISON OF BOTH ApPROACHES

In both systems, experts should support the truth-seeking process.

However, the German court expert also makes factual determinations
regarding specific issues despite the fact that the expert is not the factfinder. In the German system, the danger of a biased and partial expert is
much less than in the U.S.; however, in Germany, the expert's influence
is much greater due to the lack of control. The opportunity to appeal de
novo appears to be the only mechanism to control the expert. Yet even an
appeal de novo partially fails as an effective mechanism to control the
expert, as the hypothetical case showed. A de novo appeal entails a
financial risk that many may not be willing to take.
Both systems try to achieve truth-seeking, but each uses a different
approach - the adversarial and the inquisitorial. Neither reach this aim
completely. In the U.S., an appropriate outcome is sought by letting the
parties control the presentation of evidence, and in Germany, this is the
judge's role. We get more information in the former, but arguably less
biased information in the latter. The danger in the U.S. system is that the
party-selected expert could be influenced, while in Germany the court
expert has too much power which makes her a de facto decision-maker.
4.

CHANGES IN BOTH SYSTEMS

There are some developments in both systems which might result in
change. In the U.S., the statutory basis for appointing court-experts
already exists, FRE 706. In addition, the role of the U.S. judge has
become more active, at least during the pre-trial phase. Additionally,
there are scholars criticizing the present situation and even calling for
more changes. Meanwhile in Germany, the Supreme Court raised the
significance of partisan experts at trial. Are these only isolated
developments or is it the beginning of a new approach for both systems
regarding the role of expert witnesses?
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With respect to the analysis above, it seems that there is such a new
approach for both systems regarding the role of expert witnesses.
However, this does not recognize the different roles of expert witnesses
in U.S. and German civil litigation. These different roles are caused by
the fundamental differences in both systems. Of course, both systems are
fundamentally adversarial systems. 1I3 However, the role of the German
judge is more active than that of the American.
5.

THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE AS THE KEy DIFFERENCE

The key difference in both systems is the role of the judge. Therefore,
any change in the role of experts causes a change in the role of the judge.
The American judge acts only as a referee and, therefore, better fulfils
the idea of the adversarial system. 114 This approach is also supported by
the so-called sporting theory of justice. 115 This theory states that in a
society like the U.S., which is dominated by sport and competition, the
state provides a trial system in the form of a legal gamble where the
judge is only the referee. In recent decades, the judge has also become a
managing judge l16 and is therefore more involved in the pre-trial phase.
However, the role of the U.S. judge during the trial is still passive.
FRE 706 gives the U.S. judge the power to get more involved in the trial,
at least regarding expert witnesses. In theory, the U.S. judge has the
power to appoint court experts as often as German judges do,1I7 but U.S.
judges do not use this power due to their passive role. 118 You cannot
expect that judges apply FRE 706 more frequently if you keep this
passive role of the judge which is deeply rooted in in the U.S. adversary
system. And you cannot change one small piece which is part of the
whole system without changing the whole adversarial approach. I 19 A
change of the judge's function could also cause a change of the lawyer's

Langbein, supra note 34, at 763.
See FLEMING JAMES & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE, § 1.2 (5 th ed. 2001).
115.
FRANK, supra note 33, at 91.
116.
For details see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982); Robert
F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to
Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981).
117.
Compare John C. Reitz, Why we probably cannot adopt the German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 992 (1990) ("on paper our judges have some of the same power to
dominate the making of the factual record").
118.
[d. at 992 ("[Calling their own expert witnesses] is simply not in [the judges'] job
description, as far as the legal culture is concerned").
119.
[d. at 988.
113.
114.
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role l20 to a more passive one. Additional problems would arise in a jury
trial. By choosing the court expert the judge does in some way influence
the jury's decision although she is not the decision-maker. Through the
mannerism in which she questions the court expert, the judge can reveal
what she thinks about the expert and can thereby influence the jury's
decision. 121 If any, what should be the working relationship between the
parties and the court-appointed expert?122

6.

THE DIFFERENT LEGAL CULTURES

Any real attempt to bring the two systems into closer unity "would
involve changing, not positive law, but deeply rooted cultural
definitions."123
Both systems are too different and therefore
incompatible. 124 Attempts to change the status quo do not require new
laws, but instead, a change in legal culture. 125 Such a sweeping change
would require the support of the courts, the lawyers l26 and also the
society. Despite several problems mentioned above, neither in Germany
nor in the U.S. is there presently the necessary support for fundamental
changes, and in some instances, reformist attempts are overtly opposed.
For example, court decisions have been reversed by U.S. superior courts
because ajudge's behavior was considered too active.127
The developments mentioned above have occurred only in regard to
expert witnesses; no one, in neither country, attacks the fundamentals of
. the domestic civil procedure system. The different roles of the expert
witness is mainly attributable to fundamental differences between the
two trial systems. However, it is not possible to change just one detail,
one characteristic of a trial system, without affecting, or even attacking,
its fundamentals. Both trial systems have problems regarding expert

120.
See Gross, supra note 13, at 1200 ("The real explanation [for non-acceptance of court
experts 1is rooted in the nature of the role of the trial lawyer").
121.
/d. at 996.
122.
Pizzi, supra note 8, at 82.
123.
Reitz, supra note 117, at 988.
124.
See also Pizzi, supra note 8, at 83 ('The result is a [US] trial system that avoids neutral
experts").
125.
See also Reitz, supra note 117, at 992-993.
126.
Probably the establishment of court experts will never get the support of U.S. trial lawyers
because "they are beyond the control of lawyers". See Gross, supra note 13, at 1205.
127.
Compare Miljan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precising, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 1083, 1090-1091 (1975).
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witnesses, and the developments mentioned above are an attempt to
solve them - without changing the whole system. 128

V.

CONCLUSION

While the U.S. expert testimony system has its weaknesses, U.S. courts
should not look to the German system as a model on which to base
change, and vice versa. Each system has to respond to its weaknesses
internally, without looking abroad.
Because the systems are
fundamentally different - adversarial versus inquisitorial - there is no
basis for the blanket adoption of one set of rules by the other system.
Instead of improving the system, such adoption would actually increase
inconsistency. Furthermore, neither system is inherently better than the
other.
In both systems, expert witnesses should support the truth-seeking
process. 129 At least in theory, there are party-selected and courtappointed experts in both systems. However, each system's approach as
to how the experts should support the fact finder in the truth-seeking
process is very different. In Germany, the expert is usually appointed by
the court and has considerable power and influence due to the lack of
effective control over her decisions. These conditions lead to a situation
where the expert becomes a dejacto fact finder. In contrast, in the U.S.,
court experts are rare, but partisan experts abound. They merely provide
information to the fact finder.
Despite the different approaches to support the fact finding process,
neither U.S. nor German expert witnesses perfectly fulfill their purpose.
The German approach avoids biased experts, but it lacks efficient
mechanisms to restrict and control the substantial authority of the court
expert. On the other hand, the U.S. approach offers several safeguards
limiting the influence of experts, such as cross-examination and the
opportunity for the opponent to call its own expert. Despite the criticism
regarding the effectiveness of these mechanisms within the U.S. system,
the parties are at least given the opportunity to be active in their own
defense. In Germany the parties passively wait for the decision, and
usually accept it without criticism. The main disadvantage of the U.S.
128.
But see Taylor, supra note 24, at 210·211 (1996) ("the procedural aspects of common law
trials in the United States have been moving closer over the last century to the "inquisitorial"
systems of civil law countries.").
129.
Id. at 182-183 ("Both civil and common law institutions seek a trouble-free method of
assisting the finder of fact in those areas where he or she encounters difficulties in making an
informed finding.").
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approach is that it tends to create biased, non-objective testimony. In
addition, the U.S. system heavily relies on the strength of the party - or
more precisely, on the skill of the lawyer - to attack the credibility and
minimize the impact of opposing party's expert witness.
In my opinion, neither approach is better than the other: both have

advantages and disadvantages. Additionally, because both approaches
are the products of contrasting legal systems - adversarial V. inquisitorial
- it is not possible to make qualitative comparisons independent from the
legal system that is responsible for the difference in the fIrst place. This
may be best illustrated by PRE 706, a rule which gives U.S. courts the
same power used daily by German courts, but due to the different legal
culture, U.S. courts rarely use this power. I3O Therefore, it is not possible
to evaluate the different approaches without evaluating the whole civil
trial systems in both countries.
U.S. partisan expert testimony should not be abolished because it
supports the truth-seeking process and the experts control each other.
However, U.S. judges should be aware of the dangers of biased expert
testimony, i.e. the obstruction of the truth-seeking process. In many
cases such biased will already be disclosed by the opponent. But this
does not always happen. Therefore, in order to protect the truth-seeking
process judges must always be aware of the possibility given by FRE 706
and should use it where it seems to be appropriate to protect the truthseeking process.
In certain varieties of cases, the court should always appoint its own

expert, such as cases regarding child custody or when complicated
scientifIc issues are involved. If the scientifIc issue is complicated
partisan experts tend to confuse the trier of fact, and to prevent this, the
court should appoint its own expert to balance the partisan testimony and
to give reliable information to the jury. To assist judges in applying FRE
706, guidelines could be provided to the judges to give them an idea how
proceedings under PRE 706 might like. CASE (see page 171 infra)
could assist the courts in selecting experts.
In Germany, the Civil Procedure Code does not provide effective control
over the court expert. The opportunity to appeal de novo is a possible
control mechanism. But the most important rein on the court expert is
the requirement that judges do not de facto delegate their role as
decision-maker to the court expert. The judge appoints the court expert
130.
Compare 'a/so Gross, supra note 13, at 1206 ("In short, court-appointed experts are not
used in American trials because they are beyond the control of lawyers").
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who is expected to deliver an expert opinion. The judge is under a duty
to understand the reasoning of the expert and to questions her if things
are unclear. Of course, she does not have the same level of scientific
knowledge as the expert which limits the judge's control somewhat over
the expert. However, judges can be trained in how to effectively
question experts, and in any case, they should be aware that the opinion
of the court expert represents only one possible explanation among
several, perhaps even more logical It is the province and duty of the
judge in Germany to determine the truth. The parties can assist the judge
by pointing out inconsistencies in the court expert's opinion by the use of
partisan experts. However, the establishment of a U.S.-style crossexamination is not possible because of the very different inquisitorial
approach of the German Civil Procedure Code. A cross-examination as
conducted in the U.S. would be inconsistent with the role of the judge,
and the role of the lawyers, in German civil litigation.
Does the expert testimony in the U.S. and Germany fulfill its purpose?
Certainly, it does, but not perfectly. In a sporting sense, it would be a tie
between the U.S. and the German systems regarding expert testimony.
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